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Eric Jantz*

ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM WITH A FAINT
GREEN GLOW
ABSTRACT
For the last thirty years, environmental justice, that is, the
equitable distribution of environmental pollution among all
members of society, has informed environmental decision-making
at every level of government. While most Federal agencies
responsible for environmental regulation have taken meaningful
steps to address the disparate impacts of pollution on low-income
communities and communities of color, the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has lagged behind. As a result, lowincome communities and communities of color bear the
disproportionate burden of nuclear pollution in the United
States. This article explores the impacts of the nuclear fuel
chain on environmental justice communities, and the NRC’s
attempts to address those impacts. It will also critique the NRC’s
environmental justice policy and offer an alternative to that
policy which could result in more favorable outcomes for
communities faced with nuclear pollution.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order (“E.O.”) 12898, which
directed all executive branch agencies to implement policies that reflected a
commitment to environmental justice. 1 At the time, E.O. 12898 represented a
significant step forward for low-income communities of color seeking a more
equitable distribution of environmental pollution. 2 Although independent agencies
such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) were not required to

* Mr. Jantz is a Staff Attorney at the New Mexico Environmental Law Center. He received his
undergraduate degree from the University of New Mexico and his Juris Doctorate from Vermont Law
School in 1998. Mr. Jantz represents community organizations primarily on environmental justice and
energy issues.
1. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 at § 1-101 (Feb. 11, 1994) (characterizing
environmental justice as disproportionately high and adverse health and environmental impacts on lowincome and minority populations.)
2. Rachael E. Salcido, Reviving the Environmental Justice Agenda, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 115,
118 (2016).
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comply with the Executive Order, the Chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
announced that the NRC would voluntarily implement E.O. 12898’s provisions. 3
Despite the NRC Chair’s commitment to integrating E.O. 12898’s
provisions into the agency’s mission, the history of implementation and
development of environmental justice at the NRC demonstrates that the agency has
fallen short of realizing any meaningful gains in incorporating environmental
justice into its primary functions. Further, given the Trump Administration’s and
Congress’s recent indications 4 that nuclear power will be a centerpiece of the
nation’s energy policy, now, more than ever, low-income and communities of color
will find themselves in the atomic cross-hairs.
This article argues that the NRC had an opportunity to implement an
environmental justice policy that would have provided both procedural and
substantive protections, but chose instead to largely sidestep environmental justice
issues by failing to use the substantive health and safety provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act as a distinct basis for its environmental justice policy. Section II of this
article provides background on the environmental justice movement in the United
States and the nuclear fuel chain’s adverse health and environmental impacts on
communities of color. Section III traces how the NRC developed a policy to
address environmental racism and how that policy has been applied. Section IV
evaluates the NRC’s environmental justice policy and discusses how it fails to
meaningfully address procedural and substantive environmental racism. Finally,
Section V offers an alternative to the current NRC environmental justice policy that
would meaningfully address the environmental justice impacts of the nuclear fuel
chain.
II.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE NUCLEAR FUEL
CHAIN

Background on Environmental Justice and E.O. 12898

Much has been written about environmental racism and its causes. A
detailed exploration of environmental racism and environmental justice is beyond
the scope of this article; however, an understanding of some of the fundamental
concepts of environmental racism and environmental justice are essential to
understand how the nuclear fuel chain disproportionately impacts poor
communities of color. Environmental justice, and its converse, environmental
racism, refer to a disparate environmental pollution distribution, where low-income
communities and communities of color bear the pollution burdens of industrial
development and waste disposal more often than affluent and White communities. 5

3. Tyson R. Smith, With Liberty and Environmental Justice for All: A Decade at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 12 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 192 (2005) (noting that the March 31,
1994 letter to indicated that the NRC would endeavor to carry out the measures set forth in the
Executive Order).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan Crawford, Trump and U.S. Nuclear Power Find Common Ground in Jobs
Push, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 7, 2017, 1:03 PM).
5. Jeffrey Smith McLeod, Unmasking the Processes and Justifications that Lead to Environmental
Racism: A Critique of Judicial Decision-Making, Political and Public Ambivalence, and the
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These patterns of inequitable pollution distribution are the result of policy and legal
decisions. 6 Contemporary manifestations of environmental racism are no longer
overt; that is, they are not the result of explicitly discriminatory policies. 7
Nevertheless, since the term environmental racism was first introduced in 1982, 8
ample research has established that low-income communities of color are much
more likely to be exposed to environmental hazards—and the health effects that
accompany them—than affluent or White communities. 9 Further, when White
communities do suffer adverse environmental impacts, clean-up is quicker and
penalties for polluters stiffer than in communities of color. 10
While the causes of environmental racism are often locally idiosyncratic,
there are several causes that are generally present in environmental racism cases.
People of color are often subject to housing discrimination and discriminatory
zoning, which leads minority neighborhoods to disproportionately host undesirable
land uses such as polluting industries. 11 Private industry also consciously targets
low-income communities of color for polluting operations because property is
typically less expensive in those neighborhoods and their residents have less
political and economic power than White communities to mount resistance. 12 Weak
political opposition also makes state and local governments more likely to approve
polluting projects in communities of color than in White communities. 13 Further,
underrepresentation of people of color in government, the legal profession and
business contributes to the disproportionate pollution burden in communities of
color. 14 Finally, because communities of color lack desirable economic
development opportunities, those communities are subject to “economic
blackmail”—the promise of jobs, economic development and tax revenue
associated with polluting projects. 15

Disproportionate Placement of Environmental and Land Use Burdens in Communities of Color, 5 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 545, 546–47 (2008).
6. Id. at 547.
7. Id. at 549–50.
8. Civil rights leader Dr. Benjamin Chavis, Jr. coined the term in testimony before Congress.
Lewis C. Browne, Changing the Bathwater and Keeping the Baby: Exploring New Ways of Evaluating
Intent in Environmental Discrimination Cases, 50 ST. LOUIS L.J. 469, 472 n. 11 (2006).
9. McLeod, supra note 6, at 546–48. See, also, e.g., Lara Clark, et. al., National Patterns in
Environmental Injustice and Inequality: Outdoor NO2 Air Pollution in the United States, PLOS ONE
9(4): e94431 (April 15, 2014), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0094431
; Robert J. Brulle and David N. Pellow, Environmental Justice: Human Health and Environmental
Inequalities, 27 ANN. REV. PUBLIC HEALTH 103 (2006).
10. McLeod, supra note 6, at 547.
11. Adam Swartz, Environment Justice: A Survey of the Ailments of Environmental Racism, 2
HOWARD SCROLL SOC. J. REV. 35, 38 (1994); Alan Ramo, Environmental Justice as an Essential Tool
in Environmental Review Statutes: A New Look at Federal Policies and Civil Rights Protections and
California’s Recent Initiatives, 19 HASTINGS W-N.W. J ENV. L. & POL’Y 41,49 (2013); Paul Mohai &
Robin Saha, Racial Inequality in the Distribution of Hazardous Waste: A National Level Reassessment,
54 SOC’Y FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. PROBLEMS 343, 360 (2007).
12. Swartz, supra note 12, at 40.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 42–43.
15. Id. at 43.
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Environmental racism manifests both substantively and procedurally. 16
E.O. 12898 was intended to remedy some of the procedural, and to a lesser extent,
substantive, disparities in federal environmental decision-making. E.O. 12898
provides that, to substantively address environmental justice, federal agencies must
ensure that the programs, policies and activities federal agencies undertake do not
discriminate based on race, color or national origin. 17 This section of E.O. 12898
essentially reiterates federal agencies’ obligation to comply with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. 18
E.O. 12898’s provisions to advance environmental justice through
procedural means are more expansive. Federal agencies are charged with
identifying and addressing the ways in which their programs, policies and activities
have disproportionate environmental and health impacts on low-income
communities and communities of color.19 Federal agencies are also required to
form an inter-agency working group, consisting of representatives of many
executive branch agencies, who are tasked with developing and providing guidance
to federal agencies on “criteria for identifying disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects on minority populations and low-income
populations” as well assisting in collection of data and information on
environmental racism. 20 Further, each federal agency is required to develop
environmental justice strategies designed to improve equitable enforcement of the
laws for which each agency is responsible and increase public participation in
agency decision-making. 21 Federal agencies are also directed to collect and
disseminate research, information and data on disparate environmental and human
health impacts of federal programs, policies and activities. 22 Finally, federal
agencies are directed to enhance public participation, including the opportunity to
comment on, the incorporation of environmental justice into agency programs. 23
B.

The Nuclear Fuel Chain’s Disproportionate Environmental and Human
Health Impacts

In order to evaluate the NRC’s environmental justice policy, it is
important to first understand how nuclear power impacts low-income communities
and communities of color. The nuclear fuel chain consists of six stages: 1) uranium
ore extraction and initial processing; 2) conversion of processed uranium to
uranium hexafluoride, a chemical form suitable for further processing; 3) enriching
uranium hexafluoride by increasing the concentrations of fissionable uranium
isotopes; 4) fabricating enriched uranium hexafluoride into metal fuel rods; 5)
burning the fuel rods at nuclear power plants to generate electricity; and 6) storage

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Salcida, supra note 3, at 119–20.
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 at § 2-2 (Feb. 11, 1994).
Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Justice and Executive Order 12,898, at 1.
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 at § 1-101 (Feb. 11, 1994).
Id. at § 1-102.
Id. at § 1-103.
Id. at § 3-3.
Id. at § 5-5.
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of the used, or spent, fuel rods, either temporarily or permanently. 24 Each stage has
its own unique environmental and public health impacts, by virtue of the process
used and the waste generated. 25 Taking just three of the stages - uranium
extraction, electricity generation in nuclear power plants, and waste disposal - this
article will demonstrate that nuclear power has significant environmental justice
impacts.
1.
a.

Environmental Racism in Uranium Extraction
Occupational Exposures

Uranium’s radioactive decay products have long been associated with
increased incidences of cancer, particularly lung cancer, for those who are exposed
to the mineral. 26 In the 1950s, the United States Public Health Service began
gathering data on uranium miners in the Southwest to measure their exposures to
radiation and assess the workers’ health risks. 27 These data gathering efforts
resulted in the Public Health Service definitively associating exposure to uranium
with increased incidence of lung cancer. 28 Researchers linked uranium to lung
cancer through its decay products such as radon. 29 Radon, which is released as a
gas, is inhaled, and once in the lungs emits radiation causing inflammation that can
lead to cancer. 30
Uranium extraction in the U.S. has taken place primarily on the Colorado
Plateau in the States of New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, and Arizona. 31 During the
uranium boom of the 1950s to 1980s, 80-90 percent of uranium extraction occurred
on or adjacent to indigenous lands. 32 However, in New Mexico, Navajos were
hired only after Whites were given the opportunity to fill a job, and were invariably
only given the most dangerous positions such as underground miners and ore
haulers. 33 Those occupations involve long periods of time underground in close
proximity to the uranium ore and its decay products. 34 As a result, Navajos were
more likely to be exposed to uranium decay products in the course of their work
and suffer the health impacts of that exposure, particularly increased incidences of

24. U.S.
Nuclear
Reg.
Comm’n,
Stages
of
the
Nuclear
Fuel
Cycle,
https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/stages-fuel-cycle.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2017).
25. Id.
26. As early as 1879, European uranium miners noticed that respiratory problems were associated
with their occupation. Carrie Arnold, Once Upon a Mine: The Legacy of Uranium on the Navajo Nation,
122 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A45, A46–A47 (2014).
27. Id. at A47. It is noteworthy that the U.S. government could only get access to the miners by
guaranteeing the uranium mining companies that they would not share the risks associated with mining
with workers.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Doug Brugge & Rob Goble, The History of Uranium Mining and the Navajo People, 92 AM. J.
OF PUB. HEALTH 1410, 1410–11 (2002).
32. DORCETA E. TAYLOR, TOXIC COMMUNITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, INDUSTRIAL
POLLUTION AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 56 (N.Y.U. Press 2014).
33. Id. at 56–57.
34. Brugge & Goble, supra note 32, at 1411–13.
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lung cancer. These occupational exposures were aggravated by the mining
industry’s unwillingness to implement occupational health protections and
governments’ reluctance to require them. 35
b.

Environmental Exposures

Occupational exposures to radiation from uranium are only part of the
story. Many more people have been exposed to uranium and other mining waste by
living in close proximity to unreclaimed or inadequately reclaimed uranium mines
or mills. Recent research has linked living in close proximity to unreclaimed or
inadequately reclaimed uranium mines to a broad range of diseases including
hypertension, heart disease and kidney disease. 36 Further, unreclaimed and
inadequately reclaimed uranium mines have been linked to widespread
contamination of natural resources such as ground and surface water. 37
Uranium extraction’s health and natural resource impacts fall
disproportionately on low-income communities and communities of color. As in
most cases of environmental racism, 38 while uranium extraction has occurred in
both minority and non-minority communities, environmental and public health
mitigation measures are less likely to be implemented in minority communities and
waste remediation is less likely to be adequate.
For example, uranium milling has occurred in both minority and nonminority communities across the western United States. Uranium milling involves
crushing uranium ore and then soaking it in sulfuric acid to extract the usable
uranium. 39 Typically, each one to four pounds of milled uranium, known as
yellowcake, results in a ton of waste that is both radioactive and laced with toxic
heavy metals. 40 This waste was historically dumped in unlined pits, where it
leached into groundwater and ran off into surface water. 41
Uranium was milled in the predominantly White communities of Durango,
Colorado 42 and Moab, Utah 43 as well as the predominantly Navajo communities of

35. THE NAVAJO PEOPLE AND URANIUM MINING 33–35 (Doug Brugge et al. eds., 2006).
36. Molly E. Harmon et al., Residential Proximity to Abandoned Uranium Mines and Serum
Inflammatory Potential in Chronically Exposed Navajo Communities, 27 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENVTL.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 365, 366 (2017); Lauren Hund et al., A Bayesian Framework for Estimating Disease
Risk Due to Exposure to Uranium Mine and Mill Waste on the Navajo Nation, 178 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC’Y SERIES A 1069, 1090 (2015).
37. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 906/9-75-002, WATER QUALITY IMPACTS OF
URANIUM MINING AND MILLING ACTIVITIES IN THE GRANTS MINERAL BELT, NEW MEXICO 3 (1975);
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FEDERAL ACTIONS TO ADDRESS IMPACTS OF URANIUM CONTAMINATION
IN THE NAVAJO NATION 6 (2014).
38. See generally, supra Section II.A.
39. Arnold, supra note 27, at A45, A47.
40. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Nuclear Explained, Where Our Uranium Comes From, https://
www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nuclear_where (last visited May 24, 2017).
41. See, e.g., Paul Robinson, Groundwater Restoration Long Beyond Closure at the HomestakeMilan and United Nuclear-Church Rock Uranium Mill Tailings Piles, New Mexico, USA: Full-Scale
Programs Requiring More than 20 Years of Treatment, SW. RES. & INFO CTR.,
http://www.sric.org/mining/docs/umills.php (last visited May 24, 2015).
42. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF LEGACY MGMT., DURANGO, COLORADO PROCESSING AND
DISPOSAL SITES FACT SHEET 1 (Nov. 30, 2016).
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Churchrock 44and Shiprock, New Mexico. 45 In each case, the milling operations
resulted in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency designating the mill sites as
Superfund Sites. 46 However, in the predominantly White communities, the source
of radioactive and hazardous wastes, that is, the tailings piles, have been or are
being removed to locations away from residents. 47 In these White communities, the
mill tailings have been or are currently being moved into containment pits with
barriers to prevent the contaminants from leaching into groundwater. 48
In Churchrock and Shiprock, in contrast, the tailings piles remain near
inhabited communities. 49 Further, the tailings continue to remain in unlined pits,
posing a continuing threat to groundwater supplies. 50 Compared to White
communities, then, the pace and adequacy of uranium milling waste contamination
remediation in indigenous communities falls far behind. Disparities in hazardous
waste cleanup is typical of the environmental racism that minority communities
face.
c.

Inequitable Distribution of Benefits.

Finally, despite bearing nearly all the environmental and public health
burdens that uranium extraction causes, low-income communities of color have
received virtually none of its financial benefits. During the uranium mining boom
of the 1950s to 1980s, Navajo mine employees in New Mexico were frequently
hired only for the most unskilled and dangerous mining jobs, regardless of what
skills they actually possessed. 51 Conversely, Navajos were rarely offered
supervisory or management positions. 52 Navajos were also paid less than their
White counterparts for the same work. 53
The uranium extraction industry and the United States government have
also consistently denied or improperly reduced revenue from uranium extraction to
tribal governments. One way revenue has been diminished or withheld is by the
43. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF LEGACY MGMT., FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF MOAB
UMTRA PROJECT 1 (Jan. 2018).
44. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: EPA SIGNS RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE UNITED
NUCLEAR CORPORATION SUPERFUND SITE 1 (March 29, 2013).
45. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF LEGACY MGMT., SHIPROCK DISPOSAL SITE FACT SHEET 1
(June 2017).
46. “A Superfund Site is any land in the United States that has been contaminated by hazardous
waste and been identified by the Environmental Protection Agency as candidate for clean up because it
poses a risk to human health or the environment.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., TOXMAP
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://toxmap.nlm.nih.gov/toxmap/faq/2009/08/what-are-the-super
fund-site-npl-statuses.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
47. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 43, at 3; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 44, at 1–2.
48. Id.
49. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FOURTH FIVE-YEAR REVIEW REPORT FOR UNITED NUCLEAR
CORPORATION SUPERFUND SITE, CHURCH ROCK, MCKINLEY COUNTY, NEW MEXICO 9–10 (2013); U.S.
DEPT OF ENERGY, LONG TERM SURVEILLANCE PLAN FOR THE SHIPROCK DISPOSAL SITE, SHIPROCK,
NEW MEXICO 2–6 (Sept. 29, 1994).
50. UNITED NUCLEAR CORP., ANNUAL REVIEW REPORT - 2015: GROUNDWATER CORRECTIVE
ACTION CHURCH ROCK SITE NEW MEXICO 3–8 (2016).
51. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 56–57.
52. Id. at 57.
53. See id.
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failure to give tribes fair market value for minerals. 54 Under Federal Indian law,
tribal resources are subject to management by the federal government. 55 The
federal government manages minerals, such as uranium, on tribal lands pursuant to
a patchwork of statutes. 56 A common thread throughout these statutes is that
persons extracting minerals must submit fair payments, such as rents and royalties,
to the U.S. government for the benefit of tribes for the privilege of extracting
minerals from tribal lands. 57 However, it has been common for the federal
government to shortchange tribes on payments in part or entirely. 58
Minority communities—and indigenous communities in particular—have
borne the disproportionate burden of environmental contamination and public
health impacts from uranium mining and processing. True to established patterns of
environmental racism, those same communities gain few benefits from uranium
extraction. These communities would surely benefit from meaningful
environmental justice policies in the event of a renewed push to extract uranium.
2.

Environmental Racism in Nuclear Power Plant Operation

Environmental racism also occurs in the electricity generation stage of the
nuclear fuel chain. Recent research has indicated that nuclear reactors are more
likely to be located in ZIP codes that are predominantly poor and AfricanAmerican than in affluent, White communities. 59 As a result, those communities
are put at disproportionate risk in two ways. First, low-income communities of
color are subject to greater risks from the nuclear power plants’ day-to-day
operations. These routine risks from a typical reactor include low-level radioactive
emissions from normal reactor operation, which includes venting approximately
100 cubic feet per hour of radioactive gases and discharging 5,000 gallons per
minute of tritium-laced coolant into nearby water sources. 60 Routine risks also
include radiation exposure from cooling system leaks, plant fires, and other smallscale accidents that have become a normal part of an aging reactor fleet. 61 These
routine radioactive emissions are associated with cancer, especially in children. 62
Second, environmental racism manifests as inadequate planning for
catastrophic accidents. The NRC requires a fifty mile radius Emergency Planning

54. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 227, 268 (1985).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 173–78 (2011). For a recent
detailed discussion of the trust relationship see Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of
Indian Self-Determination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369 (2003).
56. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 396, 399 (2012); Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2101–08 (2012).
57. See id.
58. See Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 227, 246, 264 (1985) (U.S. government
failed to collect full amount of rent on uranium leases and failed to collect any royalties pursuant to
those leases).
59. Mary Alldred & Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Injustice in Siting Nuclear Plants, 2
ENVTL. JUST. 85, 91–96 (2009).
60. Dean Kyne & Bob Bolin, Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and
Radioactive Contamination, 13 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 700, 703 (2016).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Zone (“EPZ”) around every nuclear power plant. 63 Each power plant is required to
have evacuation and disaster mitigation plans for communities within the EPZ. 64 A
recent study concluded that a larger percentage of African-Americans live within
EPZs at sixty-one nuclear power plant sites than live outside the EPZs. 65 In
contrast, at the same sixty-one sites, a larger percentage of Whites lived outside the
EPZs than inside. 66 This unequal distribution of African-Americans within the
EPZs puts those individuals at greater risk in the event of a catastrophic accident
such as those at Chernobyl and Fukushima.
3.

Environmental Racism in High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Irrespective of whether the Trump administration or Congress is able to
incorporate nuclear power as a substantial part of the country’s energy mix in the
future, there is presently a significant amount of high-level radioactive waste in the
form of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants that has no permanent storage
site. 67 The problem of what to do with this spent nuclear fuel to date has only had
solutions premised on environmental racism.
In the decades of planning temporary and permanent storage locations for
the nation’s high-level radioactive waste, indigenous communities have usually
been the first to be considered as storage sites. 68 Tribal lands are often targeted as
disposal sites for toxic materials because of the perception that they are “remote
from heavily populated areas.” 69 Additionally, because indigenous tribes are more
often impoverished, they may be more willing to exchange short term financial
gain for longer term health and environmental risks. 70
Temporary, or monitored retrieval storage sites have been considered for
Mescalero Apache lands in New Mexico 71 and Skull Valley Goshute lands in
Utah. 72 The NRC readily dismissed environmental justice concerns raised by tribal

63. Id. at 704. See also, 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(c)(2) (2017).
64. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47.
65. Kyne & Bolin, supra note 61, at 704. The areas outside the EPZ were defined as the geographic
area outside the 50-mile EPZ radius, but still within the state or states encompassing the 50-mile radius.
See Dean Kyne, Public Exposure to U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Induced Disasters, 6 INT’L
J. DISASTER RISK SCI. 238, 242 (2015).
66. Kyne & Bolin, supra note 61, at 704.
67. The United States Energy Information Administration identified 69,681 metric tons of spent
nuclear fuel exists at nuclear utilities in the United States as of 2013. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Spent
Nuclear Fuel (Dec. 7, 2015), available at https://www.eia.gov/nuclear/spent_fuel/.
68. Tom B.K. Goldtooth, Environmental Injustice in “Indian Country”, in TOXIC WASTES AND
RACE AT TWENTY 1987-2007: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST JUSTICE &
WITNESS MINISTRIES 95, 95–96 (United Church of Christ 2007); Solange Captan, Driving Forces
Behind Yucca Mountain as the Sole Candidate for the Housing of a High-Level Nuclear Waste
Repository, 7 NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 99, 108–109 (2001).
69. Washington Dep’t of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1469 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985).
70. Captan, supra note 69, at 107–108.
71. Carolyn Mitchell, Environmental Racism: Race as a Primary Factor in the Selection of
Hazardous Waste Sites, 12 NAT’L BLACK L. J. 176, 178 (1993).
72. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-20, 56
N.R.C 147 (2002).
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members, 73 but ultimately, due to organized resistance, neither tribe’s land became
the site for temporary radioactive waste storage.
The controversy surrounding permanent high-level radioactive waste
storage continues, however. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (“NWPA”), as
amended, requires that the nation’s high-level nuclear waste be permanently stored
in a deep geologic repository, i.e., buried underground. 74 The repository would
store 70,000 metric tons of waste in perpetuity. 75 In the 1987 amendments to the
NWPA, Congress eliminated all other potential permanent storage sites other than
Yucca Mountain, located in Nye County, Nevada. 76 Responsibility for licensing the
repository lies with the NRC. 77 Therefore the NRC has the ultimate responsibility
for evaluating the repository’s environmental justice consequences.
Although the only communities that are within a fifty mile radius of the
proposed Yucca Mountain repository are the Western Shoshone and Timbisha
Shoshone tribes, the NRC determined that the waste repository would have
negligible environmental justice consequences. 78 Further, while the Obama
Administration eliminated funding for licensing the Yucca Mountain repository in
2011, 79 granting the two Shoshone communities a temporary reprieve, the Trump
Administration has indicated that it intends to fund licensing activities once
again. 80 Yucca Mountain’s environmental justice implications will again become
an important issue in handling the nation’s high-level radioactive waste.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION’S ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE POLICY
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission first published its draft policy
statement for the treatment of environmental justice matters in NRC regulatory
licensing actions in 2003 81 and issued its Final Statement in 2004. 82 However, the

73. Id. at 151–152.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (1983).
75. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, Backgrounder on Licensing Yucca Mountain, https://www.nrc.gov
/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/yucca-license-review.html (last updated Sept. 03, 2015).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a) (1987).
77. Id. at § 10134(b).
78. U.S. NAT’L REG. COMM’N, SUPPLEMENT TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY FOR THE DISPOSAL OF SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NYE COUNTY,
NEVADA, NUREG-2184 at 3-36 to 3-37 (2016); The NRC’s finding of no environmental justice impact
is particularly troubling in light of the well established fact that Yucca Mountain is sacred to the
Western Shoshone. Jessica Barkas Threet, Testing the Bomb: Disparate Impacts on Indigenous Peoples
in the American West, the Marshall Islands, and in Kazakhstan, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 29, 38 (2005).
79. WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS, Obama Dumps Yucca Mountain (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.worldnuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=24743.
80. Sarah Zhang, The White House Revives a Controversial Plan for Nuclear Waste, THE
ATLANTIC (March 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/yucca-mountaintrump/519972/.
81. Draft Policy Statement on the Treatment of Environmental Justice Matters in NRC Regulatory
and Licensing Actions, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,642 (Nov. 5, 2003) [hereinafter NRC Draft Policy Statement].
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NRC had been informally fashioning its environmental justice policy for years, in
the form of regulatory guidance and adjudicatory decisions. 83 In essence, the
Commission’s formal policy statement was simply a ratification of its existing
institutional practice. 84 Unfortunately, the ad hoc basis on which the institutional
practice was founded resulted in environmental justice practices that were and
continue to be little more than window dressing.
A.

Pre-Policy NRC Adjudicatory Decisions
1.

Louisiana Energy Services

The seminal NRC pre-policy statement adjudicatory decision regarding
environmental justice is In the Matter of Louisiana Energy Services, L.P.
(Claiborne Enrichment Center). 85 In this case, a consortium of electric utilities
called Louisiana Energy Services (“LES”) applied for a license with the NRC to
construct and operate a uranium enrichment facility in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana,
among the communities of Center Springs and Forest Grove. 86 The populations of
Forest Grove and Center Springs are approximately 97 percent AfricanAmerican. 87 The area lacked basic infrastructure such as paved roads and
connections to municipal water supplies. 88 According to 1990 census data, the area
was home to one of the “poorest and most disadvantaged” populations in the
United States, with 58 percent of African-Americans in the parish living below the
poverty line. 89
The proposed facility would have received processed uranium ore, called
yellowcake, and increased the proportion of the isotope uranium-235, making the
uranium suitable for use as fuel for nuclear power plants. 90 The enrichment process
generates waste in the form of depleted uranium. 91 The proposed LES facility
would have generated 3,800 metric tons of depleted uranium annually. 92 The

82. Policy Statement on the Treatment of Environmental Justice Matters in NRC Regulatory and
Licensing Actions, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,040 (Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter NRC Final Policy Statement].
83. See Louisiana Energy Servs, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI 98-3, 47 N.R.C. 77
(1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-20, 56
N.R.C. 147 (2002); U.S. NAT’L REG. COMM’N, ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW GUIDANCE FOR LICENSING
ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH NMSS PROGRAMS, NUREG-1748 at 5–22 (2003) (ADAMS accession no.
ML032450279); U.S. NAT’L REG. COMM’N, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, LIC-203,
REV. 1, NRR OFFICE INSTRUCTION: PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE FOR PREPARING ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENTS AND CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (May 24, 2004) (ADAMS accession no.
ML033550003).
84. NRC Final Policy Statement, 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,040, 52,047.
85. Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47 N.R.C. at 77.
86. Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367, 370 (1997).
87. Id. at 371.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Arjun Makhijani and Brice Smith, Costs and Risks of Depleted Uranium from a Proposed
Enrichment Facility, 13 SCIENCE FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION (The Inst. For Energy and Envtl. Res.,
Takoma Park, M.D.), June 2005, at 2 (2005).
91. Id. at 3.
92. Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47 N.R.C. 77, 83 (1998).
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adverse health effects of depleted uranium may include genetic mutations, tumors,
birth defects, cellular level toxicity and neurological damage. 93
The LES facility was opposed by a local citizens’ group, Citizens Against
Nuclear Trash (“CANT”), which challenged LES’ license application. 94 Among the
issues CANT raised in the LES licensing proceeding was that the siting of the
enrichment facility followed a national pattern of siting hazardous facilities in
minority communities and neither the NRC nor LES took steps to avoid or mitigate
the disparate impacts on the affected communities. 95 In support of its contention,
CANT presented evidence that showed that during LES’ process of narrowing
down its choices for sites for the proposed enrichment facility, the level of poverty
and percentage of African-Americans in the local populations near the proposed
sites rose dramatically. 96 CANT presented evidence that LES’ site selection
process improperly included subjective quality of life assessments, for example, a
prospective site was rejected because it was near a lake with “nice homes.” 97
CANT also argued that LES’ major site selection criterion requiring that the
enrichment facility not be located near hospitals, schools or nursing homes was
inherently biased because impoverished communities of color often lack these
basic necessities. 98 Finally, CANT presented evidence that neither LES nor the
NRC had sought community support from the closest towns of Forest Grove or
Center Springs, but instead relied on support from the community of Homer,
located five miles away from the proposed site. 99
In the initial ruling on CANT’s environmental justice arguments, the
NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (“Licensing Board”),100 ruled
that in the context of NEPA and E.O. 12898, CANT presented sufficient evidence
that racial bias may have played a part in siting the LES facility. 101 The Licensing
Board reasoned that E.O. 12898 requires that the NRC conduct its licensing
activities in a manner that does not have the effect of subjecting any persons or
populations to discrimination because of their race or color.102 Thus, the Licensing
Board concluded that, because CANT presented evidence suggesting racial bias in
siting that was ineffectively rebutted or not rebutted at all, the NRC was required to

93. Makhijani and Smith, supra note 91, at 6–7.
94. Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47 N.R.C. at 82.
95. Louisiana Energy Servs, L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367, 372 (1997).
96. See id. at 386 (CANT showed that the initial 78 potential sites had an aggregate average
percentage of 28.35% African-American residents within one mile. After the first round of site
eliminations the average of African-American residents within a mile rose to 36.78%. After the second
round of site eliminations, the average of African-American residents within a mile rose to 64.74%.
Finally, the proposed site in Claiborne Parish had an average of 97.1% African-American population
within one mile.).
97. Id. at 388.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The Licensing Board is the first level of adjudicatory decision making at the NRC. The
Licensing Board is analogous to a trial court and is responsible for making initial factual and legal
determinations when an NRC action is challenged.
101. Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367, 390 (1997).
102. Id.
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investigate further the possibility of racial bias in siting the enrichment facility. 103
Moreover, because the NRC technical staff did no independent review of the
possibility of racial bias in siting the facility, but instead relied exclusively on
documentation provided by LES, the NRC staff should have investigated racial bias
claims further. 104
LES appealed the Licensing Board’s decision to the Commission. 105
Upon review, the Commission reversed the Licensing Board’s decision. 106 In
reaching its conclusion, the Commission limited the scope of the environmental
justice inquiries to the NRC’s NEPA process. The Commission noted that a
disparate impact analysis is the NRC’s principal tool for advancing environmental
justice under NEPA. 107 Rather than conducting a searching analysis into whether a
broad range of statutes might be relevant to an environmental justice analysis, the
Commission summarily found that NEPA was the only law conceivably pertinent
to an environmental justice analysis. 108 In finding that NEPA was the only law
conceivably pertinent to an environmental justice analysis, the Commission relied
on the Presidential Memorandum on E.O. 12898 which provides that the purpose of
E.O. 12898 is to underscore certain provisions of existing law. 109 Apparently, the
Commission believed that NEPA was the only law pertinent to an environmental
justice analysis because it is a statute that centers on environmental impacts. 110
With respect to the environmental justice communities that would be
impacted by the enrichment facility, the Commission further narrowed the NRC’s
environmental justice inquiry process by holding that an inquiry into racial bias in
siting decisions “go[es] well beyond what NEPA has traditionally been interpreted
to require.” 111 Moreover, the Commission noted that devoting substantial resources
to inquiries into racial discrimination would divert funds away from the
Commission’s primary function under the Atomic Energy Act to protect public
health and safety. 112
2.

Hydro Resources, Inc.

Despite the ongoing public health and environmental crises that have
resulted from the United States’ failure to reasonably regulate the uranium mining
and milling industry in the past, the NRC continues to license uranium operations
that it acknowledges will contaminate natural resources within the Navajo Nation.

103. Id. at 391–392.
104. Id. at 390–391.
105. When acting as an adjudicatory appellate body I will refer to the five NRC Commissioners as
“the Commission”. The Commission functions as an appellate body for appeals from the Licensing
Board in adjudicatory matters. In contrast, when referring to the NRC generically as an administrative
agency carrying out its routine administrative functions, I will refer to it as the “NRC”.
106. Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P., 47 N.R.C. 77, 106 (1998).
107. Id. at 100, 102.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 102.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 102.
112. Id. at 103, n.20. Ironically, the Atomic Energy Act provides the very basis upon which the NRC
could have fashioned a meaningful environmental justice policy. See Section IV, below.
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In 1998, the NRC granted a source and byproduct materials license to Hydro
Resources, Inc. (“HRI”) to conduct uranium mining, using in situ leach (“ISL”)
technology, 113 at four sites in the Navajo communities of Churchrock and
Crownpoint in northwestern New Mexico.
The license issued by the NRC allows HRI 114 to conduct ISL mining at
four sites in the Navajo villages of Crownpoint and Churchrock. 115 The two sites in
Churchrock— called “Section 8” and “Section 17”—would be mined first. 116 The
two sites in the Crownpoint Chapter—called the “Crownpoint” and “Unit 1”
sites—would be mined later. 117 The uranium slurry generated by the mining
process will be processed at a central processing plant in Crownpoint.
The village of Churchrock is located in the Churchrock Chapter of the
Navajo Nation in northwestern New Mexico about eleven miles east of Gallup.
Like most of the areas on the Colorado Plateau, Churchrock is arid, receiving an
average of 10.2 inches of precipitation a year. 118 Churchrock is rural and
isolated. 119 Most of Churchrock’s residents are Navajo tribal members. 120 Many of
Churchrock’s residents engage in subsistence agriculture and gather medicinal and
culturally significant plants from the land. 121 As of 1999, the percentage of families
in the Churchrock Chapter living in poverty was 42.9%. 122 Approximately 48
percent of Churchrock residents had no running water in their homes and 96
percent had no telephone service in their homes. 123

113. ISL uranium mining involves injecting chemicals into an aquifer containing uranium deposits
with a series of wells. The injected chemicals break the chemical bonds between the uranium deposits
and the host ore, allowing uranium and associated heavy metals to move freely throughout an aquifer.
The uranium slurry is drawn to the surface with another set of wells. See, U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, In
Situ Recovery Facilities, https://www.nrc.gov/materials/uranium-recovery/extraction-methods/islrecovery-facilities.html (last viewed, May 9, 2017); Morris, et. al. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 598
F.3d 677, 681-682 (10th Cir. 2010).
114. Id. HRI has since sold its uranium properties to Laramide Resources, Ltd. The NRC license has
been transferred to Laramide, who must abide by all its conditions. See http://www.laramide.com/
index.php/projects22/usa11/churchrock-and-crownpoint-properties-acquisition (last viewed May 8,
2017).
115. Morris v. NRC, 598 F3d at 681–682.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. NUREG 1508, Final Environmental Impact Statement to Construct and Operate the
Crownpoint Uranium Solution Mining Project, Crownpoint, New Mexico at 3-1 (Feb. 1997).
119. Petition by Eastern Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining and Mitchell Capitan, Rita Capitan,
Christine Smith, Keithlynn Smith, Kenneth Smith and Larry King on their own behalf against The
United States of America at 11, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., (filed May 16, 2011),
http://nmenvirolaw.org/images/pdf/ENDAUM_Final_Petition_with_figures.pdf, (last visited Feb. 11,
2018), [hereinafter Petition by E. Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining] (citing n.30 “Testimony of
Robert D. Bullard, attached as Exhibit 1 to Eastern Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining’s and
Southwest Research and Information Center’s Brief in Opposition to Hydro Resources, Inc.’s
Application for a Materials License with Respect to Environmental Justice Issues . . . “).
120. Id. at 17 (citing the testimony of Robert D. Bullard); see also Churchrock, Selected
Characteristics from Census 2000, available at http://churchrock.nndes.org/cms /kunde/rts/churchrock
nndesorg/docs/429390660-09-28-2004-10-58-27k.pdf.
121. Petition by E. Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining, supra note 120, at 11.
122. See Churchrock, supra note 121.
123. Petition by E. Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining, supra note 120, at 11.
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HRI’s Churchrock mine sites each lie within territory traditionally used
and occupied by Navajos. HRI’s Section 8 licensed area is 164 acres of private land
surrounded by land held in trust for the Navajo Nation and public land used by
Navajo residents for grazing and agricultural purposes. 124 While Section 8 is
uninhabited, it is directly adjacent to Section 17, where Navajo families reside.
HRI’s Section 17 licensed area at Churchrock is located on land held in
trust by the U.S. Government for the Navajo Nation. Three families live on Section
17 inside the licensed area, and approximately 850 people live within five miles of
the Section 8 and Section 17 mining sites. Under the terms of the NRC license,
HRI may forcibly remove individuals and families from Section 17 or restrict
grazing, agriculture, and cultural activities such as plant gathering during mining
operations pursuant to the license issued by the State.125
The inequitable distributive impacts of the proposed ISL project fall
broadly into two categories: impacts on health from surface radioactive
contamination and impacts on health from groundwater contamination. Health
impacts and environmental justice concerns from surface radiation impacts were
addressed in two NRC hearings in 1999 and 2005.
The Churchrock Chapter as a whole is heavily impacted by waste from
historic uranium mining and milling. In testimony during the NRC proceedings on
HRI’s license, Dr. Christine Benally testified that most of the early uranium mines
within the Navajo Nation remain uncontrolled and unmitigated. 126 There are
thirteen sites within six miles of HRI’s Churchrock sites at which uranium mining
and processing was conducted. These sites include the United Nuclear Corporation
(“UNC”) Churchrock mill, which was an NRC licensed uranium byproduct
disposal facility and is currently designated an Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) Superfund Site. As a result, many of the 170 residences within five miles
of HRI’s Churchrock sites, are currently already exposed to levels of radon as
much as forty-two times higher than background, as measured at the Crownpoint
site. These residents are also exposed to elevated levels of gamma radiation.
HRI’s licensed area on Section 17 includes parts of the abandoned Old
Churchrock Mine, an underground uranium mine that operated in the early 1960s
and from 1977 to 1983 before HRI purchased the land in the early 1990s. Although
some of the historic mine waste has been removed, the surface of the Section 17
portion of HRI’s Church Rock licensed area remains contaminated by “dust and
rocks apparently lost from trucks hauling the ore from the site, or possibly from
excavated rock used to build the road.” 127 Near the Old Churchrock mine, HRI
124. See Hydro Resources, Inc. v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1136–37 (10th Cir. 2010).
125. See Petition by E. Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining, supra note 120, at 12 (“Affidavit of
Mr. Mark S. Pelizza at 19, ¶¶ 85–87, attached as Exhibit A to Hydro Resources, Inc.’s Response in
Opposition to Intervenors’ Written Presentation Regarding Air Emissions (July 29, 2005). Mr. Pelizza,
an executive with HRI, specifically stated: ‘HRI will control the Sec. 17 well fields by a fence and has
full discretion where this fence will be placed . . . Mr. King would be restricted from access as any other
member of the public. HRI’s surface use agreement allows unlimited use of the surface for mineral
production including fencing to restrict any portion of Section 17.’”).
126. Id. at 14 n.41 (“Testimony of Christine J. Benally, Ph.D, attached as Exhibit 2 to ENDAUM’s
and SRIC’s Brief in Opposition to Hydro Resources, Inc.’s Application for a Materials License With
Respect to Environmental Justice Issues at 24 (Feb. 15, 1999)”).
127. Id. at 12 n.37.
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measured elevated radon levels that were more than ten times higher than radon
levels at Crownpoint, where no mining had occurred, suggesting that elevated
radiation levels are due to unreclaimed mine waste. HRI also recorded gamma
radiation emissions near the Old Churchrock mine that were seventeen to twentynine times higher than “typical” gamma radiation levels for the area. In 2003, more
than twenty years after the Old Churchrock Mine closed, consultants to the
Churchrock Chapter measured high levels of gamma radiation on Section 17 in the
area around the Old Churchrock Mine. 128
Confronted with the prospect of adding to an indigenous community’s
existing radioactive burden, the NRC responded in two ways. In 1999, the NRC
Licensing Board invoked NEPA as the basis for assessing environmental justice. In
finding that the proposed project would have no disproportionate impact on lowincome or minority communities, the Licensing Board effectively erased the
community and their lived experience. The Licensing Board explained:
My visit to this site permitted me to observe the vastness of the
desert and raises serious questions about how this project at
Church Rock Section 8 could possibly have any serious adverse
impact on the people of the area. The project is industrial in
nature, but it creates no serious risk of pollution. Since I have
found the project at Church Rock Section 8 to be safe, there is no
serious adverse impact on an environmental justice population
and, unlike the LES situation, there is no basis for taking
measures to mitigate or reduce that effect. Nor is there any reason
to consider, in the context of a new project, the highly regrettable
negative impacts of prior projects that involved uranium milling
and mining. 129
The NRC’s response to the disproportionate groundwater impacts were
likewise inadequate, from an environmental justice perspective. The licensed
portions of Churchrock Section 8 and Section 17 are underlain by the Dakota
Sandstone and Westwater Canyon aquifers, both of which provide drinking water
for Navajo residents throughout the Eastern Navajo Agency. Despite significant
contamination from past uranium mining and milling, substantial amounts of good
quality groundwater remain in the Churchrock area. According to the Final
Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) the NRC prepared for the proposed ISL
mines, current water quality in the Dakota Sandstone and Westwater Canyon
aquifers at Churchrock Sections 8 and Section 17 is “good and meets New Mexico
drinking water quality standards.” 130
The NRC acknowledges that no ISL mine it has regulated has ever
restored groundwater to pre-mining conditions. 131 Nevertheless, as it did with
community members’ concerns with radioactive surface contamination, the
Licensing Board found that the EIS properly analyzed and addressed environmental
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 14 n.38.
Hydro Resources, Inc., 50 N.R.C. 77, 123 (1999).
Petition by Eastern Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining, supra note 120, at 13 n.39.
Id. at 27 n.93.
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justice concerns with respect to groundwater impacts. The Licensing Board
concluded:
Ford (Ford May 11, 1999 Affidavit at 2-15) further persuades me
of the likelihood of successful restoration and discusses the
problems associated with restoration at the Church Rock site. In
the interest of full disclosure, he reveals that “it is extremely
likely that after ISL mining is completed, the groundwater quality
will be restored to acceptable levels so that the water use of the
aquifer is maintained.” “[I]t is unlikely that groundwater
activities at the Church Rock site will achieve baseline
concentrations for all groundwater parameters . . . However, it is
likely that most, if not all, of the groundwater parameters will
achieve secondary groundwater restoration goals stated in HRI
License Condition 10.21.”
The “if not all” statement by Ford above likely is not satisfactory to the
Intervenors, but I find it adequate. 132
The Licensing Board arrived at this finding despite evidence from a
nearby historic ISL demonstration project of ongoing contamination from radium,
arsenic, and uranium. 133 Moreover, the Board concluded:
In previous partial initial decisions and my discussion of
groundwater, I have already determined that Intervenors’
principal arguments concerning environmental effects are
without merit. Accordingly, I have no basis for finding that
injection mining at the Church Rock Section 8 site will have any
serious impact on an environmental justice population. 134
On appeal, the Commission upheld these Licensing Board determinations
in their entirety. 135
3.

Private Fuel Storage

The Commission revisited its ever-contracting environmental justice
policy in In the Matter of Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation). The Private Fuel Storage (“PFS”) case involved a plan by a
consortium of electric utilities to store spent nuclear fuel on the Skull Valley
Goshute Indian reservation. 136 The project was to result in 4,000 concrete-encased
casks of high level spent nuclear fuel being stored on the reservation. 137 The
reservation was already surrounded by the Dugway Proving Ground, the Deseret

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Hydro Resources, Inc., 50 N.R.C. 77, at 103−104.
See Petition by Eastern Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining, supra note 120 at 29 n.99.
Hydro Resources, Inc., 50 N.R.C. 77, at 123.
Hydro Resources, Inc., 53 N.R.C. 31 (2001).
Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 55 N.R.C. 171, 174 (2002).
Id.
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Chemical Depot, the Envirocare mixed waste storage facility, a hazardous waste
incinerator, and the Grassy Mountain Hazardous Waste Landfill. 138
During the licensing proceeding, a group of Skull Valley Goshute
members opposed to the Private Fuel Storage plan to store nuclear waste on their
reservation alleged that the tribal chairman had misappropriated lease payments
made by PFS. 139 The Licensing Board determined that since the proceeds from the
PFS lease were not used to benefit all tribal members, a minority subgroup of the
tribe might suffer disproportionate environmental impacts from the project,
reasoning that this minority would suffer the same environmental burdens as the
rest of the tribal members but receive none or fewer of the mitigating financial
benefits. 140
The Commission reversed the Licensing Board’s decision. 141 Despite the
Commission’s recognition that “environmental harm is NEPA’s ‘core interest,’” it
determined that while NEPA allows consideration of socioeconomic costs and
benefits, that consideration is limited and the investigation of the alleged financial
misdeeds of the tribal chairman went beyond NEPA’s environmental scope. 142
B.

The NRC’s Formal Environmental Justice Policy

During the course of the LES and PFS adjudications, the NRC was
fashioning a formal environmental justice policy. The NRC’s policy was unveiled
to the public in 2003 by publication in the Federal Register.
1.

The NRC’s Draft Environmental Justice Policy

In November of 2003 the NRC published its draft environmental justice
policy for public comment. 143 The NRC’s Draft Policy is perhaps more notable for
what is absent rather than for what it includes. Instead of presenting a proactive
statement of the NRC’s environmental justice policy, the Draft Policy contains a
litany of issues that the NRC would refuse to consider in the context of
environmental justice.
The Draft Policy begins with the statement that the E.O. 12898 does not
create any new substantive requirements or rights. 144 Next, the Draft Policy
asserted that NEPA, rather than the Executive Order, obligates the NRC to consider
environmental justice related issues. 145 The NRC noted in the Draft Policy that
NEPA is the only available statute under which the NRC could carry out the
general goals of E.O. 12898. 146 In limiting its environmental justice policy to

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 147, 151 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 151–52.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 153–55.
NRC Draft Policy Statement, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,642 (Nov. 5, 2003).
Id. at 62,643.
Id. at 62,643–44.
Id. at 62,643.
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NEPA, the NRC relied heavily on the LES and PFS cases. 147 Finally, the Draft
Policy asserted that within NEPA’s context, environmental assessments would not
include environmental justice analyses, and generic and programmatic
environmental impact statements would not include environmental justice
analyses. 148
At the end of the Federal Register notice, the NRC stated that the goal for
an environmental justice analysis in the context of NEPA was to:
(1) identify and assess environmental effects on low-income and
minority communities by assessing impacts peculiar to those
communities; and (2) identify significant impacts, if any, that
will fall disproportionately on minority and low-income
communities. It is not a broad ranging review of racial or
economic discrimination. 149
2.

The NRC’s Final Environmental Justice Policy

After receiving public comment, the NRC published its Final
Environmental Justice Policy on August 24, 2004. 150 The NRC received hundreds
of public comments on its Draft Policy, many of which were negative and asked
that the NRC reconsider how it would implement its environmental justice
policy. 151 Nonetheless, the NRC implemented the Draft Policy as its Final Policy
with no substantial changes. 152
C.

How the NRC has Applied its Environmental Justice Policy

Since promulgating its Final Environmental Justice Policy, the NRC has
had several opportunities to implement that policy. Based on the most salient postpolicy cases, the NRC has seemed to have distanced itself even further from the
policy it adopted in 2004.
1.

Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Plant

In one of the earliest Commission evaluations of the NRC’s environmental
justice policy, the Commission reviewed a Licensing Board decision to summarily

147. Id. The NRC Draft Policy Statement cites several times to the LES and PFS cases as the basis
for the NRC’s environmental justice policy.
148. Id. at 62,643–44.
149. Id. at 62,645.
150. NRC Final Policy Statement, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,040 (Aug. 24, 2004).
151. See, e.g., Comment B.3, noting that both the Environmental Appeals Board and the Board of
Land Appeals had reviewed decisions for compliance with E.O. 12898 as a matter of policy under
existing statutory authority and asking the NRC to provide an explanation of how and under what
standards environmental justice issues are currently reviewed by the NRC under NEPA and existing
statutes. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52044; Comment C.1, where the commenter noted that the Atomic Energy Act
provides an adequate basis for an environmental justice review in its public health and safety
requirements. Id.
152. See NRC Final Policy Statement, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,040, 52,046–48 (Aug. 24, 2004).

266

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 58

dismiss environmental justice challenges to an early site permit 153 for a nuclear
reactor at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in Claiborne County, Mississippi. 154
Here, the Commission upheld the Licensing Board’s determination that
impacted communities had failed to raise a litigable claim that the NRC’s technical
staff had failed to sufficiently consider the socioeconomic and racial make-up of
the area most immediately impacted by the proposed reactor. 155
The communities’ concerns were twofold. First, the community claimed
that the license applicant’s Environmental Report failed to follow NRC
environmental guidance because it compared the impacted community’s economic
and racial composition to the rest of Mississippi (which has a substantial AfricanAmerican population and at the time was the second poorest state in the nation),
rather than the other sites that were being considered for the reactor, as required by
the guidance. 156 The Commission determined that simply disclosing the
socioeconomic makeup of the affected community was sufficient to inform the
public of the community’s demographics and therefore satisfied the NRC’s
environmental justice requirements for NEPA. 157
Second, the affected community claimed that the applicant’s
Environmental Report failed to address the deficiencies in emergency planning that
were a result of the affected community’s poverty. 158 The affected community
identified several emergency planning shortcomings, including the fact that
Claiborne County had only one fire station, ten police officers, and one hospital to
contend with a potential radiological emergency. 159 The Commission held this
contention was not litigable because the Environmental Report disclosed the
socioeconomic and racial makeup of the community and the affected community
had not shown that the emergency planning deficiencies would fall
disproportionately on the 34 percent of Claiborne County’s population that was
below the poverty line compared to the 66 percent of the population that was above
the poverty line. 160
2.

North Anna Nuclear Power Plant

In another case, the Commission approved an early site permit for two
nuclear reactors associated with the North Anna Nuclear Power plant in Louisa
County, Virginia. 161 The Commission reviewed, among other issues, a

153. Sys. Energy Res., Inc. (Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf Esp Site), 61 N.R.C. 10, 10 (Jan. 18,
2005); see also U. S. Nuclear Reg Comm’n, EARLY SITE PERMIT APPLICATIONS FOR NEW REACTORS
(last viewed May 14, 2017). https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp.html (An early site permit
allows a nuclear reactor operator to secure certain safety reviews from the NRC prior to constructing a
reactor or informing the NRC of the type of reactor that will be used).
154. System Energy Resources, Inc., 61 N.R.C. 10.
155. Id. at 12.
156. Id. at 18.
157. Id. at 19.
158. Id. at 12.
159. Id. at 14.
160. Id. at 20.
161. Dominion Nuclear N. Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for N. Anna Esp Site), 66 N.R.C. 215, 215
(2007).
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determination by an NRC Licensing Board that the NRC’s technical staff failed to
make a sufficiently detailed analysis of the environmental justice issues associated
with the planned construction of the nuclear reactors under NEPA and the NRC’s
environmental justice policy. 162
The Licensing Board concluded that pursuant to the NRC’s environmental
justice policy and NRC environmental justice guidance, the NRC’s technical staff
had failed to take a more “detailed” look at the proposed reactors’ impacts on the
low-income and minority population the technical staff had identified as being
impacted. 163 In reversing the Licensing Board’s decision, the Commission initially
drew attention to its view that the NRC environmental justice policy is
voluntary. 164
The Commission then distinguished between the technical staff’s
environmental justice analysis and its explanation of that analysis in the
environmental impact statement. 165 The Commission concluded that irrespective of
whether the underlying analysis was thorough or not, NRC guidance and policy
does not require the technical staff to provide a comprehensive explanation of its
analysis in the FEIS. 166 Thus, even while concluding that the technical staff’s
environmental justice discussion in the FEIS was “rather cursory,” “thin,” and
“terse” it was nevertheless sufficient to satisfy the NRC’s environmental justice
policy and guidance because the technical staff ultimately concluded that the
environmental justice impacts would be “small” and the record accurately reflected
that conclusion. 167
3.

Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant

In a third case, in a proceeding to renew the operating license for two
nuclear reactors at the Indian Point nuclear power plant, located approximately
twenty-four miles north of New York City, the Commission was faced with the
issue of whether the NRC technical staff could rely on the safety findings in a 1996
generic EIS for the license renewal before it. 168 As a generic document, the 1996
generic EIS did not contain site specific environmental justice considerations. 169
The impacted communities provided evidence to the Licensing Board that poverty
and site-specific community characteristics like language barriers, presented

162. Id. at 220.
163. Id. at 238–239.
164. Id. at 240. This statement seems to imply that the NRC’s environmental justice policy may be
ignored or applied arbitrarily.
165. Id. at 241.
166. Id. at 242–243.
167. Id. at 247–248.
168. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 2 & 3), 81 N.R.C. 340, 350–51 (2015).
169. Id. at 367-368. Generic and programmatic environmental impact statements have identical
purposes, i.e., to evaluate the environmental consequences of wide ranging federal programs or policies
that may result in common or regularly recurring impacts. See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC,
462 U.S. 87, 101 (1983). In contrast, site specific environmental impact statements evaluate the
environmental consequences unique to a particular federal action or project. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
United States NRC, 708 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2013).
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obstacles to emergency evacuation in the event of a serious nuclear accident. 170 The
Licensing Board accepted the evidence and concluded that the technical staff had
failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental justice impacts in the Indian Point
EIS.171 The Commission reversed the Licensing Board, holding that concerned
community members should not be able to even raise the issue of disproportionate
impacts of a catastrophic accident on low-income or minority communities. 172 The
Commission reasoned that the NRC technical staff properly relied upon the
previous generic evaluation of the type of reactor employed at the Indian Point
facility, and was not required to inquire whether there were unique or site-specific
disproportionate impacts on low-income or minority communities. 173
IV.

THE NRC’S ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE POLICY FAILS TO
MEANINGFULLY ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Irrespective of whether one measures the NRC’s policy of limiting
environmental justice analyses to environmental impact statements against the
metric of providing low-income or minority communities with enhanced
opportunities to influence licensing decisions or against the metric of securing
particular outcomes, the policy is a failure. As discussed below, the NRC’s policy
fails not only on its own terms, it also represents a missed opportunity to enact
significant and meaningful environmental justice reform.
A.

The NRC Environmental Justice Policy Fails to Address Procedural
Inequality

As noted in Section II.A, above, environmental justice has both procedural
and substantive aspects. NEPA is generally recognized as a procedural statute,174
and the NRC’s reliance on NEPA as the vehicle for its environmental justice
analyses limits environmental justice in the NRC framework to procedural
concerns. The NRC’s decision to focus on procedural inequities, in and of itself,
raises concerns about its commitment to addressing environmental racism.
However, even analyzed within the confines of procedural environmental justice,
the NRC’s environmental justice policy is inadequate.
1.

The Commission’s interpretation of the NRC environmental justice
policy limits consideration of environmental justice impacts.

170. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3), 81 N.R.C. at
373–74.
171. Id. at 375.
172. See id. at 380–81 (noting that “estimated doses to all populations in the event of a severe
accident are expected to be within regulatory limits, that is, within generally accepted norms.”).
173. Id.
174. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (“[I]t is now well
settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.
If the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the
agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.
(citations omitted)”).
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The Commission’s decisions both before and after the NRC’s
environmental justice policy was enacted demonstrate that the Commission
demands very little in the way of rigorous environmental justice analysis. As the
Grand Gulf and North Anna decisions illustrate, the Commission appears to require
nothing more than the mere disclosure of impacted community demographics to
satisfy the NRC’s obligations under NEPA.
Simply disclosing disproportionate impacts on minority communities in an
EIS is insufficient to satisfy E.O. 12898 ‘s intent. The Council on Environmental
Quality, 175 in its environmental justice guidance under NEPA, identifies two
important goals in considering impacts to low-income or minority communities
under NEPA. 176 First, an environmental justice analysis helps identify unique
impacts that might otherwise be overlooked. 177 Second, identifying such impacts
will in turn heighten agency attention to alternatives, mitigation measures,
monitoring programs, and community preferences for the project. 178
The Commission’s endorsement of “thin” and “terse” 179 environmental
justice evaluations in an EIS cannot but undermine these goals. Perfunctory EIS
disclosures limit the information available to impacted low-income and minority
communities, thereby limiting their ability to meaningfully analyze and comment
on the NRC’s reasons for a particular project. Moreover, many environmental
justice communities often lack the resources to conduct a comprehensive search of
NRC records to piece together the NRC’s rationale for a project, if that rationale is
absent in the EIS.
Further, the Commission’s reactor safety NEPA decisions indicate that it
consistently substitutes analysis of the risks of catastrophic accidents occurring for
the impacts of catastrophic accidents if they do occur. This analytical device further
limits the environmental justice analysis. In the Indian Point nuclear power plant
license renewal case, for example, the Commission upheld the technical staff’s
decision to rely on nineteen-year-old generic reactor safety findings as a substitute
for site-specific findings. 180 The Commission reasoned that because the generic EIS
for reactors found that the probability-weighted consequences of a catastrophic
nuclear accident were small, the NRC technical staff could substitute those findings
for a site-specific finding for the Indian Point facility. 181
The Commission’s reasoning evidences a further weakening of the
procedural protections that NEPA could provide. When the NRC relies on the risks
of a catastrophic nuclear accident being small to imply that the consequences of
such an accident would also be small in order to avoid analyzing those

175. See 42 U.S.C § 4321 (1970). The Council on Environmental Quality was created by NEPA.
The Council on Environmental Quality oversees NEPA implementation through issuing guidance and
interpreting regulations. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/about (last
viewed May 22, 2017).
176. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 10 (1997).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Dominion Nuclear N. Anna, LLC, 66 N.R.C. 215, 247–48 (2007).
180. See Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Units 2 and 3), 81 N.R.C. 340, 379 (2015).
181. Id. at 380.
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consequences, the result is that the consequences remain unconsidered.
Unconsidered consequences are particularly dangerous for low-income and
minority communities who are substantially more likely to lack the capacity to deal
with catastrophic accidents compared to more affluent and White communities.
Moreover, the NRC is contradicting federal precedent by substituting an
evaluation of risks for an evaluation of impacts. In New York v. NRC, the Federal
Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit held that under NEPA, under
most circumstances, an analysis of risk is no substitute for an analysis of
impacts. 182 Only when the risk of harm is so remote or speculative as to reduce its
occurrence to zero would a finding of “no significant impact” be warranted. 183 The
risk of catastrophic nuclear reactor accidents is certainly not zero 184 and most
significant environmental and health impacts associated with other stages of the
nuclear fuel chain unfortunately have occurred throughout the history of nuclear
power development. As a mechanism for evaluating environmental justice impacts,
then, the NRC’s practice of substituting an analysis of risks for an evaluation of
impacts is insufficient under NEPA.
2.

The Commission’s interpretation of the NRC’s environmental justice
policy appears to endorse disregarding intentional discrimination.

A significant part of the NRC’s final environmental justice policy is
founded on the Commission’s decision in the LES case. 185 This reliance on LES,
however, creates a dissonance within the NRC’s environmental justice obligations.
In LES, the Commission acknowledged that its decision on environmental
justice would have “profound” policy and legal implications. 186 Nevertheless, the
Commission rejected the Licensing Board’s determination that when the evidence
in a licensing proceeding suggests a systematic discriminatory approach to siting a
hazardous facility, the NRC should investigate further. 187 As noted in Section
III.A.1, supra, the Commission decision is premised on the assumption that NEPA
is the only statutory grounds for identifying environmental discrimination. 188

182. New York v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, 2002 DAVIS-BESSE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD
DEGRADATION KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT DIGEST, NUREG/KM-0005 1 (2014); Judith Lewis, How
We
Almost
Blew
Up
Ohio,
MOTHER
JONES
MAG.
(April
28,
2008),
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2008/04/ how-we-almost-blew-ohio/; A.G. Sulzberger &
Matthew L. Wald, Flooding Brings Worries Over Two Nuclear Power Plants, N.Y.TIMES (June 20,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/us/21flood.html. The reactor meltdowns at Three Mile
Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima are well documented. Less well publicized are the regular near misses
at reactors throughout the United States. See also Union of Concerned Scientists, Near Misses at U.S.
Nuclear Power Plants in 2015, tbl. 2, 6–7 (2016) (The Union of Concerned Scientists documented
ninety-one events that narrowly avoided major meltdowns at U.S. nuclear reactors between 2010 and
2015.).
185. See NRC Draft Policy Statement, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,642 (Nov. 5, 2003).
186. Louisiana Enrichment Servs., 47 N.R.C. 77, 100 (1998).
187. Id. at 101.
188. Id. at 102.
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Nothing in NEPA or NEPA jurisprudence, the Commission concluded, required the
NRC staff to investigate a claim of racial discrimination. 189
The Commission’s view seems to preclude looking for intentional
discrimination in the course of the licensing process, which puts the NRC’s process
at odds with national civil rights laws. This view seems to indicate the NRC will
willfully ignore evidence that suggests intentional environmental discrimination
when raised, as it was in the LES case, by parties to a licensing proceeding.
3.

The Commission’s interpretation of the NRC’s environmental justice
policy encourages reliance on generic environmental impact
statements.

The NRC’s environmental justice guidance specifically exempts
programmatic 190 and generic EISs from any environmental justice analysis. 191 This
broad exemption puts environmental justice communities, and the public generally,
in the untenable position of having to guess whether a particular health, safety or
environmental issue addressed in a generic EIS will be imported wholesale to a
site-specific environmental justice analysis years down the road. This scenario has
already played out in NRC licensing proceedings. 192
This reliance on generic environmental impact statements shortchanges
environmental justice communities’ ability to effectively participate in the NEPA
process with respect to site specific environmental justice issues. Most obviously, it
temporally limits environmental justice communities’ ability to participate in the
NEPA process. Generic EISs at best afford the public only one opportunity to
identify environmental justice impacts that may occur as a result of a particular
generic issue. Once that opportunity is gone, the public, and the most heavily
impacted communities may never get another opportunity for input. Further, even
if an environmental justice community can avail itself of the narrow window of
opportunity to comment on a generic EIS, it would be forced to predict possible
environmental justice consequences far in the future, including anticipating future
demographic and socioeconomic shifts.

189. Id.
190. See generally Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (A
programmatic environmental impact statement addresses the broad environmental impacts of a wideranging federal program. A programmatic EIS is premised on the assumption that a systematic federal
program is likely to generate related environmental consequences).
191. NRC Final Policy Statement, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,040, 52,047 (Aug. 24, 2004) (The NRC’s final
environmental justice policy statement provides that “due to the site-specific nature of an
[environmental justice] analysis, [environmental justice]-related issues are usually not considered during
the preparation of a generic or programmatic EIS.”). Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations, 48 Fed.
Reg. 34,263, 34,267 (July 22, 1983) (The NRC considers an environmental justice analysis at the
programmatic or generic EIS level purely discretionarily, and indeed, often inappropriately. The Council
on Environmental Quality, which is responsible for interpreting and implementing NEPA, defines
generic and programmatic EISs as initial EISs that address broad, general programs, policies, or
proposals).
192. See discussion supra Section III.C.3.
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B.

The NRC’s Environmental Justice Policy Fails to Address Substantive
Environmental Inequality

While the NRC’s environmental justice policy could be significantly
improved by implementing more robust NEPA analyses, even the most rigorous
NEPA analysis would still be limited by NEPA’s procedural nature. In other words,
the best NEPA analysis would not necessarily result in concrete health outcomes in
those communities most impacted by the nuclear fuel chain. For concrete
outcomes, a substantive environmental justice policy is needed. However, the
Commission effectively shut the door to any substantive measures addressing
environmental racism in the nuclear fuel chain before it even formally adopted an
environmental justice policy, when it held in the LES decision that NEPA was the
“only conceivable” means by which environmental justice might be evaluated. 193
As argued below, however, the NRC’s organic statute - the Atomic Energy Act provides a basis for addressing substantive environmental inequality in a
substantive way.
V.

THE NRC MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE A
MEANINGFUL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE POLICY

In fashioning its environmental justice policy, the NRC had an
opportunity to create a policy that would afford substantive protection to lowincome and minority communities. Instead of limiting its environmental justice
review to a constricted view of NEPA, the NRC could have based its policy on the
public health and safety provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, which would have
given greater protections to minority and low-income communities affected by
NRC licensed activities.
A.

Relevant Atomic Energy Act Provisions

The Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) is the implementing statute for the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It provides for the NRC’s regulatory authority,
including its authority to issue licenses to possess and transport nuclear materials
and construct nuclear power plants. 194 The NRC’s primary mandate, pursuant to the
Atomic Energy Act is to protect public health and safety. 195 Accordingly, the
Atomic Energy Act contains numerous provisions prohibiting the issuance of any
license by the NRC that fails to protect the public health and safety. For example,
with respect to source material, 196 the AEA provides:
The Commission shall not license any person to transfer or deliver,
receive possession of or title to, or import into or export from the United States any

193. See discussion supra Section III.A.1. (It is noteworthy that while E.O. 12898 itself uses NEPA
as an example as a way in which the E.O. could be implemented, nothing in the E.O. indicates that
NEPA should be the only means of implementation).
194. See generally Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296(b)-7 (2012).
195. Louisiana Enrichment Servs., L.P., 47 N.R.C. 77, 103 n.20 (1998).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(z) (2012); 10 C.F.R. 20.1003 (“Source material” is uranium, thorium or
other material determined by the Commission to be source material or ores containing concentrations of
0.05% or greater of uranium or thorium).
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source material, if in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license to
such person for such purpose would be inimical to the common defense and
security or the health and safety of the public. 197
The AEA also has public health and safety requirements with respect to
byproduct material 198 and special nuclear material. 199 Finally, the AEA has public
health and safety requirements for nuclear power plant operation. 200 As discussed
in more detail below, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has already used
similar broad grants of discretion in the statutes it implements and enforces to
substantively consider and address environmental inequities.
B.

The Atomic Energy Act Health and Safety Provisions Provide a Basis for
a Meaningful Environmental Justice Policy

Although it is the NRC’s view that NEPA provides the only conceivable
statutory authority for its environmental justice analysis, the Atomic Energy Act’s
health and safety provisions could provide an additional basis for a meaningful
environmental justice policy. 201 The NRC would therefore not only have the
procedural remedies that NEPA affords, but would also have the discretion to
fashion substantive remedies, such as license conditions, under the auspices of the
Atomic Energy Act.

197. 42 U.S.C. § 2099 (2012) (emphasis added).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(2012) (“Byproduct material” is defined, in part, as “any radioactive
material . . . made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or
utilizing special nuclear material . . . [or] the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or
concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source material content.”);
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (2012) (“Special nuclear material” is defined, in part, as artificially
enriched material that is not source material, including plutonium or uranium enriched in the 233 or 235
isotope); See also 42 U.S.C. § 2073(e) (2012).
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(b) - (d), 2201(b) (2012). See New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm’n,
406 F.2d 170, 175 (1st Cir. 1969); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. St. Energy Res. Conservation and Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983).
201. The NRC does not appear to have given the idea of using the AEA’s public health and safety
provisions any serious thought. In response to a comment on the NRC’s draft environmental justice
policy suggesting that the AEA could serve as a basis for its environmental justice policy, the NRC
simply noted that:
[t]he AEA does not give the Commission the authority to consider EJ-related issues in NRC licensing
and regulatory proceedings. Apart from the mandate set forth in NEPA, the Commission is limited to the
consideration of radiological health and safety and common defense and security. Citing New
Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Commission, 406 F.2d 170, 175, 176 (1st Cir. 1969).
NRC Final Policy Statement, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,040, 52,044 (Aug. 24, 2004). However, the Chemical
Waste Management case, discussed below, had long been decided and could have served as a model for
the NRC’s environmental justice policy. The NRC appeared never to have considered using the
reasoning in Chemical Waste Management in fashioning its own environmental justice policy.
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Similar Provisions in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Have Been Used by the Environmental Protection Agency as the
Basis for its Environmental Justice Policy.

While the NRC apparently has not considered using the Atomic Energy
Act’s omnibus health and safety provisions as a basis for environmental justice
analyses, using omnibus health and safety provisions is not unprecedented. The
EPA has used similar broad grants of discretion to impose substantive
environmental justice measures on polluting facilities subject to its regulatory
authority.
The EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (“Appeals Board”) has used
similar omnibus language from several environmental statutes to find EPA
authority to make substantive environmental justice inquiries, and three of those
decisions are instructive. The Appeals Board used omnibus language in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) to uphold a substantive
agency wide environmental justice policy. In In re: Chemical Waste Management
of Indiana, Inc., the Appeals Board acknowledged that while E.O. 12898 did not
change the substantive requirements for issuance of a permit under RCRA and its
implementing regulations, where the EPA has discretion to act within the
constraints of RCRA and its regulations, the EPA should exercise that discretion to
the greatest extent practicable to implement the Executive Order. 202
In particular, the Appeals Board noted that under RCRA’s omnibus
clause, which provides that “[e]ach permit issued under this section shall contain
such terms and conditions as the Administrator (or the State) determines necessary
to protect human health and the environment,” the EPA is required to craft permit
conditions that would eliminate health and environmental risks, and if no such
permit conditions could be crafted, then the permit must be denied. 203 The Appeals
Board concluded that when a comment on a draft permit raises at least a
superficially plausible claim that a project would disproportionately impact a
minority or low-income community, the EPA is required to include in its
environmental impacts assessment an analysis “focusing particularly on the
minority or low-income community whose health or environment is alleged to be
threatened by the facility.” 204 If such an analysis found that the project would truly
cause harm to human health or the environment, the EPA is required to fashion
permit conditions to protect health and the environment or if no conditions can be
fashioned, deny the permit. 205
Later Appeals Board decisions reinforce the decision in Chemical Waste.
In In re Envotech, L.P., the Appeals Board construed the omnibus health and safety
provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act to allow EPA to conduct an analysis of
whether low-income or minority communities would be disproportionately
impacted by construction of hazardous waste injection wells. 206 In reaching its
conclusion, the Appeals Board stated:

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

6 E.A.D. 66, 72 (1995).
Id. at 74 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(3)).
Id. at 75.
Id. at 74.
6 E.A.D. 260, 281–82 (1996).
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[W]e hold that when a commenter submits at least a superficially
plausible claim that a proposed underground injection well will
disproportionately impact the drinking water of a minority or
low-income segment of the community in which the well is
located, the Region should, as a matter of policy, exercise its
discretion under 40 C.F.R. § 144.52(a)(9) to include within its
assessment of the proposed well an analysis focusing particularly
on the minority or low-income community whose drinking water
is alleged to be threatened. In this way, the Region may
implement the Executive Order within the constraints of the
SDWA and the UIC regulations. 207
In another case, the Appeals Board remanded two permits granted under
the Clean Air Act for an oil exploration project off the coast of Alaska. 208 The
Appeals Board based its remand, in part, on the EPA’s failure to conduct an
adequate environmental justice analysis when Native Alaskan groups had raised
evidence of health disparities between the community of Inupiat Eskimos most
impacted by the oil exploration project and the rest of the U.S. population. 209 The
Appeals Board decision was also premised on an acknowledgement that
environmental justice must be considered in connection with issuing Prevention of
Significant Deterioration permits under the Clean Air Act. 210
Using these broad statutory grants of discretion to implement a broader
environmental justice policy is uncontroversial. The Environmental Law Institute
(“ELI”) 211 published a report in 2001 analyzing sources of statutory authority that
could serve as the bases for EPA environmental justice activities. 212 In that report,
ELI reviewed all the major environmental statutes EPA is charged with
implementing and enforcing, and concluded: “[a]ll of EPA’s sources of authority –
environmental statutes, mission-expanding and cross-cutting laws, and general
discretion – give the agency substantial and wide-ranging powers to pursue
environmental justice.” 213 The power to consider environmental racism and fashion
remedies to address it is generally contained in the broad statutory authority to
protect human health or to take necessary and appropriate action to carry out an
environmental statute’s goals. 214 Such remedies include denying operating permits
or fashioning permit conditions based on environmental justice concerns. 215 The

207. Id. at 282.
208. Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. & Shell Offshore, Inc., 15 E.A.D. 103, 105 (2010).
209. Id. at 150.
210. Id. at 149.
211. The ELI is a non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to policy analysis, public education
and information dissemination on environmental issues. See About the Environmental Law Institute,
ENVTL. LAW INST., https://www.eli.org/about-environmental-law-institute (last visited May 23, 2017).
212. ENVTL. LAW INST., OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS
OF U.S. EPA STATUTORY AUTHORITIES (2001).
213. Id. at 3.
214. Id. at 14.
215. Id. at 17–18.
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National Academy for Public Administration 216 reached a similar conclusion after
reviewing EPA’s air, water and waste programs. 217
The omnibus language in RCRA, the SDWA, the CAA and other
environmental statutes is substantially similar to the health and safety provisions in
the AEA. Hence, the NRC could have implemented an environmental justice policy
similar to the EPA’s. Such a policy would have gone much further to protect lowincome and minority populations affected by NRC licensed projects than the
current NRC environmental justice policy.
2.

The Atomic Energy Act Health and Safety Provisions Provide a
Substantive Basis for the NRC’s Environmental Justice Policy.

Like the environmental statutes that EPA administers, the AEA health and
safety provisions provide a basis for a substantive NRC environmental justice
policy. Nothing in the Atomic Energy Act would prevent the NRC from exercising
its discretion under the omnibus health and safety provisions of the AEA to
conduct substantive environmental justice analyses. Nor does anything in the AEA
represent an obstacle that would prevent the Commission from adopting the
environmental justice analytical framework which the EPA Appeals Board has
applied to the statutes the EPA administers.
Moreover, a substantive environmental justice policy grounded in the
Atomic Energy Act would benefit the communities most impacted by the nuclear
fuel chain. For example, because every person or entity seeking to possess nuclear
materials or operate a nuclear facility must first obtain a license, 218 environmental
justice could be considered in every instance, not just those instances where an
environmental impact statement would be required under NEPA. Therefore, by
basing an environmental justice policy on the AEA, in addition to more robust
NEPA analyses, the gaps left by relying on NEPA as the sole basis for an
environmental justice analysis are filled.
Further, in contrast to NEPA’s framework, under the Atomic Energy Act,
the NRC would have less room to discount the adverse consequences of a licensing
action. If a proposed licensing activity was found to adversely affect the health or
safety of an environmental justice population, the NRC would be required, under
the AEA, to either impose license conditions that eliminated the adverse health and
safety consequences or deny the license application. In contrast, under NEPA, even
if the NRC finds that a licensed activity disproportionately impacts a low-income
or minority community, it can choose to ignore those impacts if it determines that
other considerations, including economic considerations, outweigh the
disproportionate impacts. 219

216. The National Academy of Public Administration is a Congressionally chartered non-profit, nonpartisan organization charged with providing analysis and advice on matters of public administration.
See Who We Are, NATIONAL ACADEMY. OF PUB. ADMIN., http://www.napawash.org/about-us/who-weare.html (last visited May 23, 2017).
217. NATIONAL ACADEMY. OF PUB. ADMIN., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN EPA PERMITTING:
REDUCING POLLUTION IN HIGH-RISK COMMUNITIES IS INTEGRAL TO THE AGENCY’S MISSION at 38
(2001).
218. 10 C.F.R. § 40.3 (1990).
219. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
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Finally, an environmental justice policy under the AEA would impose no
new duties on the NRC, nor would it confer any new rights or causes of action.
Under the AEA, the NRC is already required to analyze the health and safety
aspects of a proposed project. An environmental justice policy grounded in the
AEA would simply require the NRC to assess whether an environmental justice
population would be disproportionately affected by the project and if so, if there are
any special factors that might make the proposed project particularly risky to the
health and safety of that community. For example, Native American and Hispanic
populations tend to have higher incidences of diabetes than Caucasian populations,
which make them more susceptible to the kidney damage that is caused by
ingesting even low concentrations of uranium over time. 220 Under an AEA-based
substantive environmental justice policy, projects resulting in elevated levels of
uranium, a potent nephrotoxin, that could be ingested by populations that might
face greater health risks from uranium ingestion, such as Native Americans and
Hispanics, would be less likely to be ignored by the NRC.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is charged with protecting all
Americans from the health risks of nuclear materials. However, the NRC has
repeatedly passed up opportunities to fulfill its regulatory role with legal decisions
and policy initiatives that relegate environmental justice decisions to mere paper
disclosures. With current efforts in Congress and the Trump Administration to
promote and expand nuclear power, the NRC has been given another opportunity to
revisit its environmental justice policy and fashion a policy that truly protects lowincome and minority populations. Such a re-examination could lead to the NRC
fully realizing its mandate to protect public health for all Americans and provide a
framework for avoiding environmental inequities if the push to increase nuclear
power is successful. The NRC should not again fail to take an available opportunity
to create a meaningful environmental justice policy.

220. See Barbara Malczewska-Toth et. al., Community Engaged Cumulative Risk Assessment of
Exposure to Inorganic Well Water Contaminants, Crow Reservation, Montana, 15 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES.
& PUBLIC HEALTH 76 (2018).

